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Introduction 
This article examines the differences between American law and International 
Human Rights law to determine whether freedom from domestic violence should be 
considered a basic human right and whether new law is needed in the United States to 
protect that right. Part I looks at the U.S. Supreme Court case Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in 
which the Supreme Court held that although Jessica Gonzales had a restraining order 
against her husband, the Colorado police could not be held liable for Mr. Gonzales 
kidnapping his three daughters or for their consequent deaths. The Court held that the 
government is generally not responsible for the violence of private actors; even though 
Ms. Gonzales had a court issued restraining order against her husband and had reported 
the kidnapping to the police multiple times, the Supreme Court found that she did not 
have a procedural due process right to the enforcement of her restraining order.  
Part II of this article examines international cases that are similar to the Gonzales 
case, in which international courts have found that a government’s failure to protect 
citizens from known private threats of violence violates their basic human rights. After 
losing in the U.S. Supreme Court, Ms. Gonzales took her case to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, which is an international court of human rights, where 
she successfully sued the United States; this case is examined in Part III.  
Part IV of this article then looks at the global impact of the Gonzales decision at 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by examining a Kenyan case in which 
Kenyan police were found liable for neglecting, omitting, refusing, and otherwise failing 
to conduct prompt, effective, and professional investigations into the rape and defilement 
of over 160 young girls throughout Kenya.  
 3 
Part V of this article then examines ways in which local cities throughout the 
United States have responded to the Gonzales decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
deviation from international human rights standards, by enacting local ordinances and 
statutes declaring that freedom from domestic violence is a basic human right. Lastly, 
Part VI considers possible solutions to the failure of the federal government to recognize 
that domestic violence should be considered a violation of the most basic human rights.  
Part I – Castle Rock v. Gonzales 
 
In the 2005 Supreme Court case Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, Jessica 
Gonzales had obtained a restraining order from the state of Colorado against her abusive 
husband.1 The restraining order required that he remain at least 100 yards away from the 
home where his wife and three daughters resided. Mr. Gonzales was, however, permitted 
to take the children to a dinner once a week at an agreed upon visitation time.2 Several 
weeks after the order was issued, Mr. Gonzales took his daughters while they were 
playing outside the home without notifying his wife.3 Throughout the evening, Ms. 
Gonzales called the police multiple times seeking assistance in locating her daughters, 
ensuring their safe return, and enforcement of her restraining order.4 However, the police 
took virtually no action, despite the fact that Mr. Gonzales later called Ms. Gonzales to 
inform her that he had the children with him at an amusement park in Denver, Colorado.5 
At approximately 3:20 AM the following morning, Mr. Gonzales pulled up to the Castle 
Rock police station and began firing shots at officers. A shoot-out ensued, after which the 
                                                        
1 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
2 Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
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bodies of Jessica Gonzales’s three daughters were found in the back of Mr. Gonzales’s 
truck, riddled with bullets.6 
  Jessica Gonzales sued the Town of Castle Rock under the Due Process Clause of 
the 14th Amendment, which provides that a state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.7 In order to have a claim under the Due Process 
Clause, an individual must have a property interest in police enforcement of the 
restraining order; Ms. Gonzales argued that she had such an interest. As the Supreme 
Court stated, to have a property interest, “a person (1) must have more than (a) an 
abstract need or desire, or (b) a unilateral expectation of a property interest; and (2) must, 
instead, have a legitimate claims of entitlement to the interest.”8 The Supreme Court also 
noted that “[p]roperty interests are not created by the Federal Constitution… they are 
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law.”9 In this case, the applicable state law from 
which Ms. Gonzales claimed her property interest arose was Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-
893.5(5) (1999).10  
 The restraining order obtained by Jessica Gonzales pursuant to the Colorado 
statute included preprinted language that directed a peace officer to use “every reasonable 
means” to enforce a restraining order.11 However, the Supreme Court held that this did 
not make enforcement of the restraining order mandatory for the following three reasons. 
First, a well-established tradition of police discretion had long coexisted with apparently 
                                                        
6 Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748. 
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748. 
11 Id.  
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mandatory arrest statutes. Second, it would be hard to imagine that a police officer would 
not have some discretion to determine that, despite probable cause to believe that a 
restraining order had been violated, the circumstances of the violation or the competing 
duties of that officer or that officer’s agency counseled against enforcement in a 
particular instances. Lastly, the practical necessity for discretion was particularly 
apparent in a case such as the case at hand, where the suspected violator was not present 
and his whereabouts were unknown.12 Furthermore, the applicable Colorado state statute 
being interpreted by the Supreme Court provided that “a peace officer arresting a person 
for violating a restraining order or otherwise enforcing a restraining order is not to be 
held civilly or criminally liable unless he has acted in bad faith and with malice or has 
violated the rules adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court.”13 
 Because of their reading of these statutes, the Court held that Jessica Gonzales 
had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of her restraining 
order, and was therefore unable to claim that the Castle Rock police department had 
violated her right to due process.14 To have a property interest in a benefit as abstract as 
enforcement of a restraining order, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”15 The Colorado statute created no such clear and 
explicit entitlement.  
Part II – International Cases Finding State Liability 
                                                        
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748. 
15 Id.  
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 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated rulings that the United States 
government has no duty to protect individuals from private violence16, many international 
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have found that states are liable for 
failure to protect individuals from private violence. There are two requirements to find 
states legally responsible for such failures: 1) the State “knew or ought to have known of 
a situation presenting a real and immediate risk to the safety of an identified individual 
from the criminal acts of a third party,” and 2) the State “failed to take reasonable steps 
within the scope of its powers, which might have had a reasonable possibility of 
preventing or avoiding the risk.”17 
A. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras 
Several other cases heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) and committees for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) have found other States to be liable for the 
failure to protect citizens from a clear risk of private violence. One such case is Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras, which was heard before the IACHR in 1988.18 This case 
involved the kidnapping and disappearance of approximately 150 people in Honduras 
who were considered by the State to be dangerous to national security.19 However, 
Honduran officials either denied the disappearances entirely or claimed that they were 
incapable of preventing or investigating them.20 
                                                        
16 See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
17 Caroline Bettinger-López, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation, 40 
Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 19 (2008). 
18 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, 36 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1913, 1919 (2014). 
19 Velásquez. 
20 Id. 
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 The IACHR found in this matter that Honduras had violated many articles of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.21 First, Honduras violated Article 4, which 
ensures the right to life, because “the practice of disappearances in Honduras often 
involved secret executions and concealment of bodies, [which] is a flagrant violation of 
the right enshrined in Article 4.22 The Commission also found a violation of Article 5, 
which ensures the right to humane treatment, because investigations into the forced 
disappearances, as well as testimony from victims, suggested that the victims were 
usually subject to “cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment during their detainment.”23 
Lastly, the Commission found a violation of Article 7, which ensures the right to personal 
liberty, because “the kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and an 
infringement of the right to be brought without delay before a judge….”24 The 
Commission awarded reparations in the form of both pecuniary damages and continued 
investigation into the fates of those who disappeared.25  
B. A.T. v. Hungary 
 Another case finding State liability is A.T. v. Hungary, a case heard by a CEDAW 
committee.26 The petitioner, A.T., had been subjected to severe domestic violence by her 
common law husband and the father of her two children.27 However, she did not go to a 
shelter because one of her children had severe brain damage that a shelter would not be 
                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Velásquez, at 1919-20.  
23 Id, at 1920.   
24 Id, at 1921.   
25 Id, at 1923-24.   
26 A.T. v. Hungary, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under 
article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Thirty-Second Session, at 1 (2005). 
27 Id, at 1.  
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equipped to handle.28 In proceedings regarding the husband’s access to the family home 
following the petitioner’s decision to change the locks to prevent him from gaining 
access, the district court found in his favor, and the decision was upheld by the Budapest 
Regional Court on appeal.29 Petitioner then instituted criminal proceedings against her 
husband, which were unreasonably prolonged.30 
 Therefore, Petitioner later sued the State of Hungary, alleging that it had “failed to 
provide effective protection from her… husband, neglecting its ‘positive’ obligations 
under the [CEDAW] Convention and supporting the continuation of domestic violence 
against her.”31 She also argued that the lengthy criminal proceedings against her husband, 
the lack of protection and/or restraining orders under current Hungarian law, and the fact 
that her husband had not spent any time in custody constituted violations of her rights 
under the Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.32 
 In its decision, the Committee held that a delay of over three years in criminal 
proceedings amounted to an “unreasonably prolonged delay,” especially considering the 
fact that the petitioner had been at risk of irreparable harm, had received threats to her 
life, and had no possibility of obtaining temporary protection from a restraining order 
while the proceedings were in progress.33 The Committee noted that “States may also be 
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of 
                                                        
28 A.T. v. Hungary, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under 
article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Thirty-Second Session, at 2 (2005).  
29 A.T. v. Hungary (Communication No. 2/2003), United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, at 1 (2005). 
30 Communication No. 2/2003, at 1.   
31 Id.   
32 A.T. v. Hungary, at 3.   
33 Communication No. 2/2003, at 2. 
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rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence….”34 On this basis, the Committee 
found that Hungary had failed to fulfill its obligations under the CEDAW Convention, 
and had therefore violated the rights of the petitioner.35 
C. Goekce v. Austria 
A domestic violence case involving the State of Austria was brought before the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 
2007.36  Goekce v. Austria was brought by two Austrian organizations, the Vienna 
Intervention Centre against Domestic Violence and the Association for Women’s Access 
to Justice, that protect and support victims of gender-based violence.37 A former client of 
the Intervention Centre and victim of domestic violence, Şahide Goekce, was shot and 
killed by her husband in front of her children.38 The police had denied two previous 
requests that her husband be detained despite the fact that they knew he owned a handgun 
and that he had threatened to kill his wife on several occasions.39  
                                                        
34 A.T. v. Hungary, at 11. 
35 Id, at 12.  
36 Goekce v. Austria, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
Thirty-Ninth Session, at 1 (2007). 
37 Goekce, at 1-3.  
38 Id, at 4.   
39 Id, at 3.  
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 The complaint argued that the State of Austria violated Articles 140, 241, 342, and 
543, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women for failing to take “all appropriate measures to protect Goekce’s right to personal 
security and life.”44 The complaint also alleged that the State had failed to treat Mr. 
Goekce as a violent and dangerous offender in accordance with criminal law.45 
Furthermore, the complaint asserted that the Austrian Federal Act for the Protection 
against Violence within the Family did not provide adequate means to protect women 
from highly violent persons, especially in cases of recurrent violence and death threats.46 
Lastly, the complaint noted “that women are far more affected than men by the failure of 
public prosecutors to take domestic violence seriously…. Women are also 
disproportionately affected by the practice of not… punishing offenders in domestic 
violence cases appropriately.”47 
                                                        
40 Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) provides: 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 
41 Article 2 of the CEDAW Convention provides: 
“State Parties [must] condemn discrimination against women in all its forms… [by refraining] 
from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public 
authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation… [by taking] all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise… [and by taking] all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against 
women….” 
42 Article 3 of the CEDAW Convention provides that “States Parties shall take… all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms….” 
43 Article 5 of the CEDAW Convention provides that States take all appropriate measures “[t]o modify the 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices… which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes….” 
44 Goekce, at 5. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
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 The Committee first noted that “[u]nder general international law and specific 
human rights conventions, States may… be responsible for private acts if they fail to act 
with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of 
violence….”48 The Committee found that Austria had violated Şahide Goekce’s rights to 
life and physical and mental integrity under Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention.49 Its 
findings were based on the fact that the police knew or should have known that Goekce 
was in serious danger, particularly because her husband had shown that he had the 
potential to be a very dangerous and violent criminal.50 Therefore, the Committee held 
that the Austrian police were accountable for failing to exercise due diligence to protect 
Goekce.51 
D. González, Monreal, and Monárrez v. United Mexican States 
 In 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights both filed and heard a 
case against Mexico for the disappearance and murders of three women– González, 
Monreal, and Monárrez .52 The murders had occurred in the city of Juárez, a border town 
between the United States and Mexico where gender-based violence, including the 
abduction, rape, and murder of young women was a regularity in the 1990s.53 The bodies 
of these three women, two of whom were minors, had been discovered in November 
2001 in a cotton field known as Campo Algodonero.54 The IACHR found that Mexico 
had violated its human rights obligations under the American Convention of Human 
                                                        
48 Goekce, at 21.  
49 Id, at 22.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Campo Algodonero: Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos 
Monárrez v. United Mexican States, Organization of American States– Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (2007).  
53 Campo Algodonero, at 13.  
54 Id, at 7-8.   
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Rights including the right to life under Article 4, the right to humane treatment under 
Article 5, and the rights of the child under Article 19.55 The Commission ordered Mexico 
to satisfy several remedial measures including– the construction of a national memorial, 
renewed investigations into the disappearances of the women, reparations of over 
$200,000 to each of the families, and the prevention of any recurrence of similar human 
rights violations through the use of coordinated policies and resources “to guarantee that 
cases of violence against women are adequately prevented, investigated, and 
punished…”56 
E. Summary 
All of these cases involved the failure of governments to make reasonable efforts 
to protect their citizens from known threats of violence. Furthermore, in all of these 
cases, sovereign States were held liable in international courts for their failure to protect 
citizens from the violence of private actors. In the Velásquez case, Honduras was held 
liable for the disappearance of 150 people.57 In A.T. v. Hungary, a CEDAW committee 
found that a three-year criminal proceeding constituted an unreasonable delay, especially 
given the fact that restraining orders were unavailable in Hungary to provide temporary 
relief to a battered woman during criminal proceedings.58 In the Goekce case, Austria was 
found liable for the death of Ms. Goekce after failing to respond to her requests that her 
husband be detained for threatening to kill her.59 Lastly, in the Campo Algodonero case, 
                                                        
55 Id. 
56 Id, at 21.  
57 Velásquez, at 1919. 
58 Communication No. 2/2003, at 2. 
59 Goekce, at 5. 
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Mexico was found liable for failing to prevent and investigate the regular abduction, rape, 
and murder of young women in the city of Juárez throughout the 1990s.60  
Despite these international cases, the U.S. government has found no duty to 
protect individuals from private violence, even where there was a clear threat and an 
opportunity for law enforcement to act to try to avoid harm.61 In the Supreme Court case 
DeShaney v. Winnebago, a father had been under investigation by the Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services (DSS) for child abuse. However, the county did not 
remove the child from the father.62 When the father later beat the his son so severely that 
he was deemed to be profoundly retarded, the boy and his mother brought a substantive 
due process claim, alleging that the county DSS had deprived the boy of his liberty by 
failing to intervene and protect him against a risk of violence of which they knew or 
should have known.63 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding: 
Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against 
invasion by private actors. The Due Process Clause is phrased as a limitation on a 
state’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and 
security…. Its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative 
obligation on the state to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through 
other means. Like its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government from abusing 
its power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.64 
 
These differences between American law and International Human Rights law raise the 
question– Should American law include the right to freedom from domestic violence in 
light of international human rights norms? When the Jessica Gonzales finally appealed 
                                                        
60 Campo Algodonero. 
61 See generally Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
62 DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
63 Id. 
64 Id.   
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her case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission issued a 
verdict against the United States, finding that freedom from domestic violence should be 
considered a basic human right.65 
Part III – Gonzales at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 In 2011, Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan) sued the United States at the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights after failing to find relief from the United 
States Supreme Court.66 Ms. Lenahan’s counsel, who included the American Civil 
Liberties Union, argued that the United States had violated the American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man67 by failing to exercise due diligence to protect Jessica 
Lenahan and her daughters from domestic violence.68 The petitioner further alleged that 
the state of Colorado never duly investigated the killing of Ms. Lenahan’s daughters in 
order to clarify the circumstances of their deaths and that the United States government 
did not “provide her with an adequate remedy for the failures of the police.”69 Although 
eleven years had passed since the passing of Jessica Lenahan’s daughters, she still did not 
know the cause, time, and place of their deaths.70 
 The IACHR found that the United States had violated its obligations as a 
signatory of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.71 First, the 
Commission concluded that by issuing a restraining order, the state recognized the 
necessity to protect Ms. Lenahan and her daughters, but it failed to fulfill this duty with 
                                                        
65 Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al v. United States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Report No. 80/11 (2011). 
66 Lenahan, at 1. 
67 The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man was the world’s first international human 
rights treaty and was adopted by the nations of the Americas in Bogotá, Colombia in 1948. 
68 Lenahan, at 1. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id, at 43.   
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due diligence: “The state apparatus was not duly organized, coordinated, and ready to 
protect these victims from domestic violence by adequately and effectively implementing 
the restraining order at issue…”72 The Commission found that this failure was a violation 
of Article II of the American Declaration, which ensures equal protection and non-
discrimination, because there had been a historical problem with the enforcement of 
protection orders by police73– a problem that has disproportionately affected women.74 In 
finding an Article II violation, the Commission underscored “that all States have a legal 
obligation to protect women from domestic violence: a problem widely recognized by the 
international community as a serious human rights violation and an extreme form of 
discrimination.”75 
 The Commission further found that the failure of the United States to adequately 
organize its state structure to protect women and children from domestic violence also 
constituted a violation of Ms. Lenahan’s daughters’ right to life under Article I, and their 
right to special protection as children under Article VII of the American Declaration.76 
The Commission noted that because children have a right to special protection under 
Article VII, States have a duty to apply due diligence and to act expeditiously to protect 
children from right to life violations; this requires “that the authorities in charge of 
                                                        
72 Lenahan, at 43.  
73 Id, at 43. See also, U.S. Department of Justice Attorney General’s Task Force on Domestic Violence: 
Final Report, at 8 (noting that the problem of family violence in the United States has existed for 
generations but has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves) and pages 18-19 
(recommending that family violence should be recognized and responded to as a criminal activity, and that 
law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges should develop coordinated responses to family 
violence) (1984).  
74 Lenahan, at 43. See also, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime 
Victimization Survey, at 6 (noting that of about 623,000 violent crimes committed by an intimate partner in 
2007, 554,000 were against female victims while only 69,000 were against male victims; the number of 
female victims was about 8 times that of male victims) (2007). 
75 Lenahan, at 44.  
76 Id, at 44.  
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receiving reports of missing persons have the capacity to understand the seriousness of 
the phenomenon of violence… and to act immediately.”77  
In the Gonzales (Lenahan) case, the police appear to have assumed that the girls 
would be safe because they were with their father. However, there is extensive 
international recognition of the link between domestic violence and fatal violence against 
children committed by parents that the Colorado police officers should have been aware 
of.78 The Commission found no protocols and/or directives in place to guide the Colorado 
police officers on how to respond to missing children in the context of protection orders 
and domestic violence.79 
 Lastly, the Commission found that the United States had violated Article XVIII of 
the American Declaration, which provides that all persons are entitled to judicial 
remedies when they have suffered human rights violations:80 
The Inter-American has affirmed for many years that it is not the formal existence 
of such remedies that demonstrates due diligence, but rather that they are 
available and effective.81 Therefore, when the State apparatus leaves human rights 
violations unpunished and the victim’s full enjoyment of human rights is not 
promptly restored, the State fails to comply with its positive duties under 
international human rights law.82 
                                                        
77 Id, at 44. Citing, Campo Algodonero, at 62 para. 285 (ordering the Mexican State to strengthen its 
institutional capacity to fight the existing pattern of impunity regarding cases of violence against women in 
the city of Juárez “through the use of effective criminal investigation that receive a consistent judicial 
follow-up, thus guaranteeing adequate punishment and reparation”) (2007).  
78 Lenahan, at 44-45. Citing the United Nations Study on Violence Against Children (which confirms that 
the most violence acts against children are usually carried out by people they know and should be able to 
trust, such as parents), available at http://www.unviolencestudy.org/. 
79 Lenahan, at 45.  
80 Lenahan, at 46. Citing, Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 
No. 54/01, para. 37 (2000). 
81 Lenahan, at 46. Citing, Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendatriz, et al. v. United States, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 81/10, para. 62 (holding that it is a fundamental role for the 
courts of a state in ensuring and protecting basic human rights and concluding “that when a state fails to 
provide an adequate and effective remedy to a violation of a fundamental right under the American 
Declaration, that deficiency creates an independent violation of the right to judicial protection under Article 
XVIII of the American Declaration”) (2010). 
82 Lanahan, at 46. Citing, Organization of American States– Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Access to Justice for Women Victims of Domestic Violence in the Americas, at 11 para. 26 
(providing that a “State’s duty to provide judicial remedies [to victims of domestic violence] is not fulfilled 
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Due to the fact that the United States did not provide Jessica Lenahan with an effective 
judicial remedy for the non-enforcement of her protection order or a diligent investigation 
into the deaths of her daughters, the United States violated Article XVIII.83  
 According to the Inter-American Commission, “gender-based violence is one of 
the most extreme and pervasive forms of discrimination, severely impairing and 
nullifying the enforcement of women’s rights.”84 In this vein, the international and 
regional systems have noted the strong link between discrimination, violence, and due 
diligence, and have therefore determined that “a State’s failure to act with due diligence 
to protect women from violence constitutes a form of discrimination, and denies women 
their right to equality before the law.”85 These principles of international law have even 
been applied to hold States liable for failures to protect women from domestic violence 
by private actors;86 this is in direct opposition to the Supreme Court holdings in 
DeShaney and Gonzales, which held that the State does not have a duty to provide 
services to the public for protection against private actors.87 Since domestic violence has 
been recognized at the international level as a human rights violation that is one of the 
                                                        
merely by making those remedies available to victims on paper; instead, those remedies must be adequate 
to remedy the human rights violations denounced”) (2007). 
83 Lenahan, at 47.  
84 Id, at 30. Citing United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, General 
Assembly Resolution 48/104 (expressing concern that violence against women is an obstacle to the 
achievement of equality, development, and peace; affirming that violence against women constitutes a 
violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women; recognizing that violence against women is a 
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which has led to 
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement 
of women; and recognizing that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which 
women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men) (Dec. 20, 1993). 
85 Lenahan, at 30. See generally, CEDAW Committee, Communication 2/2003, Ms. A.T. v. Hungary (Jan. 
26, 2005); IACHR, Report No. 28/07, Claudia Ivette González and Others (Mexico) (Mar. 9, 2007); I/A 
Court H.R., Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico (Nov. 16, 2009). 
86 Lenahan, at 30. See generally, IACHR, Report No. 54/01, Maria Da Penha Maia Fernandes  (Brazil) 
(April 16, 2001). 
87 See generally, DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189. 
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most pervasive forms of discrimination, why has the United States, as a leader in the 
international community, failed to also make this recognition and to assume the 
responsibility of diligently protecting its citizens from domestic violence?88 
Part IV– Domestic Court Finding State Liability 
 Just one year after the Lenahan decision, the equality effect, an international non-
profit organization committed to women’s and girls’ human rights issues, initiated the 
“160 Girls” project in Kenya.89 The purpose of the project was to hold Kenyan police 
accountable for their failure to enforce defilement90 laws and for neglecting their duty to 
protect girls in Kenya from this egregious form of violence.91 The initiative was known 
as the “160 Girls” project because at the time of its inception, Ripples International, a 
plaintiff in the case, had rescued over 160 defilement victims who needed access to 
justice.92  
 The incidence of rape in Kenya had reached epic proportions by 2011. Statistics 
show that every thirty minutes, a girl/women was raped in the country.93 Furthermore, 
young girls were especially vulnerable, with nearly one in three Kenyan girls between the 
ages of thirteen and twenty-four having experienced sexual violence.94 The petitioners of 
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the “160 Girls” case had all been victims of defilement, as well as other forms of sexual 
violence and child abuse, between the years 2008 and 2012.95 Although the petitioners 
had made reports of the acts of defilement at various police stations, the officers 
neglected, omitted, refused, or otherwise failed to conduct prompt, effective, and 
professional investigations into the complaints.96 They also often failed to even record the 
complaints in the police occurrence book, to visit the crime scenes, or to interview 
witnesses.97 
 Fortunately for these victims, equality effect’s legal team and social workers at the 
shelter in Meru documented these police failures.98 The evidence submitted with the 
complaint was over 502 pages in length and detailed the specific police treatment of the 
girls.99 The plaintiffs were eleven girls, ranging in age from five to fifteen years old, who 
had made complaints to police stations regarding their defilement at the hand of family 
members, neighbors, employers, and even a police officer.100 The evidence included an 
affidavit of C.K., a five-year-old girl, who had been raped by her uncle.101 When Ripples 
International had brought this incident to the attention of the police, the police had asked 
for money in order to intervene.102 In another case included in the evidence, when fifteen-
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year-old F.K. became pregnant after being raped by her neighbor, the police told her that 
they could not investigate her rape or arrest the perpetrator until the baby was born.103 
 The petition alleged that by failing to investigate the claims of these young girls, 
the police had violated their rights under the Kenyan Constitution, as well as other 
regional and international human rights treaties.104 These rights included: “the right to 
and freedom from discrimination, the right to security of the person, and the right to 
access justice.”105 The petition cited directly to the Lenahan case.106 
 On May 27, 2013, the High Court of Kenya ruled in the girls’ favor.107 The Court 
found that the police were directly responsible for the psychological harms flowing from 
the mistreatment the girls had received by the police; these harms were also found to 
amount to a violation of the girls’ constitutional rights.108 The Court also noted that the 
inaction by the police had rendered them indirectly responsible for the harms inflicted 
upon the girls by their rapists:109 
Police unlawfully, inexcusably and unjustifiably neglected, omitted and/or 
otherwise failed to conduct prompt, effective, proper and professional 
investigations to the said complaints. That failure caused grave harm to the 
petitioners and also created a climate of impunity for defilement as perpetrators 
were let free.110 
 
The Court found that the failure to conduct these investigations violated several 
provisions of national law. First, the police violated both express and implied provisions 
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of Article 27 of the Kenyan Constitution,111 which guarantees the rights to equal 
protection before the law and equal benefit of the law.112 Article 27 also provides: 
Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal 
opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres…. The State shall 
not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including 
race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.113 
 
The Court also found a violation of Article 244 of the Kenyan Constitution, which 
requires that the National Police Service “strive for the highest standards of 
professionalism, prevent corruption, promote accountability, “comply with constitutional 
standards of human rights and… train staff to the highest possible standards of 
competence and integrity….”114  
 Based on its holding, the Court ordered the National Police Service to conduct 
thorough investigations into each of the cases.115 Furthermore, the Court ordered the 
police to take the appropriate measures to implement Article 244 of the Kenyan 
Constitution, which requires that police respect and comply with human rights 
standards.116 Such holdings and remedies are consistent with the other cases discussed in 
this article that involved state liability for failure to protect women and girls from private 
citizens, such as Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras and Campo Algodonero v. Mexico, 
both of which were heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.117  
 Based on the cases above in which both domestic and international courts around 
the world have held that freedom from domestic violence is a basic human right and that 
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States are responsible for diligently protecting their citizens from such violence, it is 
reasonable to question how the United States could possibly be ignoring and inhibiting 
this progress that is now demanded in international law. 
Part V – Local Ordinances in the United States 
 Although the United States Supreme Court has failed to recognize that freedom 
from domestic violence is a basic human right and to hold states and police accountable 
for neglecting to enforce restraining orders and diligently protect their citizens, several 
cities throughout the United States have stepped up and demanded justice for victims of 
domestic violence by passing local ordinances on the subject. The first city to pass such a 
resolution was Cincinnati, Ohio, which recognized the prevalence of domestic violence 
and declared that “freedom from domestic violence is a fundamental human right” and 
that “state and local governments bear a responsibility to continue securing this human 
right on behalf of their citizens.”118 In 2012, Baltimore, Maryland followed suit, “FOR 
the purpose of joining world leaders and leaders within the United States in recognition 
of domestic violence as a human rights concern and declaring that the freedom from 
domestic violence is a fundamental human right.”119  
 Since 2011, at least twenty-six U.S. towns and cities have passed ordinances or 
resolutions declaring that domestic violence is a human rights concern and that freedom 
from domestic violence is a basic human right.120 Some of these cities include Buffalo, 
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New York; Miami-Dade, Florida; Miami Springs, Florida; Montgomery County, 
Alabama; Seattle, Washington; Washington, D.C.; Austin, Texas; Boston, Massachusetts; 
Jacksonville, Florida; and Chicago, Illinois.121 However, as no legal action has yet been 
taken on the basis of these ordinances; therefore, it is still unknown what impact they will 
have. In 2015 President Obama issued a proclamation affirming the “basic human right to 
be free from abuse.”122 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has taken no 
action to make this near-globally accepted notion a reality in the United States. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court struck down Congress’s attempt to enact legislation on 
this issue in United States v. Morrison (discussed further below). 
Part VI – Solutions 
 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Gonzales, which Justice Ginsberg joined, argued that 
although the Federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause did not create a property interest 
to police protection from domestic violence,123 “federal law imposes no impediment to 
the creation of such an entitlement by Colorado law.”124 The dissent made a great 
analogy: If Jessica Gonzales had entered into a contract with a private security firm, that 
firm would have been obliged to provide protection to her family.125 Furthermore, Ms. 
Gonzales’ interest in that contract would undoubtedly constitute a “property” interest 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.126 Therefore, by entering a restraining 
order to protect Ms. Gonzales, the Colorado judge created the functional government 
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equivalent of such a private contract, thereby granting Ms. Gonzales entitlement to 
mandatory protection by the local Colorado police; that state-created right would also 
qualify as a “property” interest entitled to constitutional protection.127 
Viewing a civil restraining order as a contract between the government and the 
plaintiff requiring the government to do its due diligence to protect the plaintiff is a 
strong alternative argument to the Supreme Court’s previous finding in DeShaney, in 
which the Court held the government has no duty to protect individuals from private 
violence, even where there was a clear threat.128 The issuance of the restraining order by 
a judge creates a government duty of protection because it creates a property interest in 
such protection. 
Another possible solution would be for the United States to follow the worldwide 
trend and pass a federal statute declaring that freedom from domestic violence is a basic 
human right. However, Congress has attempted to pass one similar law in the past, and it 
was met with mixed reactions from courts.129 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
(VAWA), a part of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, was passed “in 
recognition of the severity of the crimes associated with domestic violence, sexual assault 
and stalking.”130 The bill marked the first comprehensive federal legislative package 
designed to criminalize and end violence against women.131 The VAWA included 
provisions on rape and battering that focused both on prevention and victim services.132 
The bill included the first federal criminal law against battering and also required that 
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every state afford full faith and credit to restraining orders and orders of protection issued 
anywhere in the United States.133 The passage of the VAWA caused a paradigm shift 
regarding how issued of violence against women were addressed in the United States.134 
Congress asserted that its power to pass this law stemmed from both the 
Commerce Clause135 and the Fourteenth Amendment.136 At the time the VAWA was 
being drafted, the controlling precedent regarding the Commerce Clause suggested that 
“Congress had the power to regulate activities… [that] had a substantial effect on 
commerce.”137 Congress believed that domestic and sexual violence qualified under this 
test given the fact that domestic violence alone cost between $5 and $10 billion a year in 
health care and criminal justice.138 Congress further believed that it had the power to pass 
this Act under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows 
Congress to ban state actions that it has found to be violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.139  
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Unfortunately, the Violence Against Women Act no longer provides federal 
criminal relief for the victims of gender-motivated violence.140 This federal remedy, 
which provided federal relief to victims of gender-based violence, was struck down as 
unconstitutional in the Supreme Court case United States v. Morrison.141 The 5-4 
majority rejected the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act on the 
grounds that gender-based violence is itself not “economic” in nature; therefore, 
Congress did not have the power to pass this Act under the Commerce Clause.142 The 
majority also rejected the claim that Congress had the power to pass the Act under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the civil rights 
remedy of the Violence Against Women Act was aimed at redressing harm inflicted by 
private actors, as opposed to state actions.143 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, noted, “If the allegations here are 
true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide… a remedy…. But under our 
federal system, that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not 
by the United States.”144 On the other hand, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, argued 
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that the Violence Against Women Act contained a "mountain of data assembled by 
Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."145 
Unfortunately, Justice Roberts’ statement has proven to be untrue in the years following 
the Morrison case; students at universities across the country are filing lawsuits against 
their schools for mishandling and rejecting their sexual assault claims.146 
Since the Supreme Court has held that the issuance of a restraining order does not 
create a “property” interest that is entitled to constitutional protection147 and that 
Congress does not have the power to pass a law criminalizing gender-motivated violence 
at the federal level,148 what other solutions are available to victims of domestic violence 
seeking redress for the government’s failure to protect them? As stated in Part V of this 
article, local cities can continue to pass ordinances and statutes declaring that freedom 
from domestic violence is a basic human right. Better yet, states could pass such laws.”149 
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Another solution is a federal consent decree. In 2011, the Department of Justice 
investigated the Puerto Rico, New Orleans, and Maricopa County police departments, 
finding that they engaged in patterns or practices of discriminatory, unconstitutional 
policing, including gender-biased policing in their response to domestic and sexual 
violence.150 The Justice Department entered into consent decrees with the Puerto Rico, 
New Orleans, and Maricopa County police departments, requiring them to respond to and 
investigate reports of domestic violence and sexual assault professionally, effectively, 
and in a manner free of gender-based bias.151 Unfortunately, as the DOJ has only 
investigated and entered into consent decrees with these three counties, this response is 
inadequate in addressing police failures across the country.  
One last solution for victims of domestic violence in the United States would be 
for the U.S. to respect its international treaty obligations. As a signatory of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man152 and a member of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights,153 the United States has an obligation to respect and 
implement all decisions of the IACHR.154 In 2011, the IACHR found that the United 
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States had violated the basic human rights of Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) and her 
daughters.155 In its decision, the IACHR also made recommendations to the United States 
and required their implementation.156 These recommendations included: 1) investigation 
into the deaths of Ms. Lenahan’s three daughters; 2) investigation into the failures that 
took place relating to the enforcement of Ms. Lenahan’s restraining order as a guarantee 
of their non-repetition; 3) reparations to Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales); 4) the adoption of 
“multifaceted legislation at the federal and state levels, or to reform existing legislation, 
making mandatory the enforcement of protection orders and other precautionary measure 
to protect women from imminent acts of violence, and to create effective implementation 
mechanisms”157 (emphasis added); and 5) to design protocols at the federal and state 
levels that specify the proper procedures for the investigation by law enforcement 
officials into reports of missing children in the context of a restraining order violation.158 
Unfortunately, thus far, the United States has failed to fulfill its duties and 
reparations imposed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:159 “[T]he US 
lacks any coordinated mechanisms to communicate how its human rights commitments 
and obligations should shape domestic policy…. The failure to communicate these 
standards [to government actors and law enforcement] and their importance for policy 
compounds the likelihood that serious violations will persist.”160 By honoring its treaty 
obligations under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, its 
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membership in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and by implementing 
the recommendations of the IACHR, the United States would go a long way toward 
ensuring the accountability of police officers and other government officials, thereby 
creating greater protection against violence for women across the country.161 Women that 
have been granted restraining orders by a court of law should be able to rely on police to 
enforce those orders and should know that if the police fail to diligently do so, the 
government will hold them accountable.162 
Part VII – Conclusion 
 Even if the Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitution to impose an 
obligation on government officials to protect citizens from known threats of violence 
committed by private actors,163 international human rights law does.164 As a signatory of 
many human rights treaties and as a leader in preventing and responding to gender-based 
violence around the world, the United States has a duty to provide the same human rights 
standard to its own citizens. Although Congress does not have the power to pass such a 
law (except through constitutional amendment, which is extremely rare), U.S. obligations 
under international human rights treaties must be implemented into local domestic 
violence hearings and trials to ensure that courts at the local, state, and federal levels are 
finding gender-based violence to be a human rights violation and that law enforcement 
officials are accountable for failing to diligently prevent such violence.  
 
                                                        
161 Lapidus.  
162 Lapidus.  
163 See generally Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, and DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189. 
164 Lapidus.  
